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LECTURE
IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THE GRIT
♦
IN THE WHEELS OF INDUSTRY?
The Right Honourable Lord Justice Jacob ∗

In this lecture the author argues that the system of granting a time-limited
monopoly is a prudent means of obtaining disclosure of an invention. Yet the
modern ramification of disclosure is the presence of a surfeit of information
exacerbated by the globalization of commerce. The result is a marked
increase in transaction costs. Transaction costs can be lessened to the extent
that the scope of the right in question can be sharply delineated and the
time-limit is not excessively generous. Unfortunately, the system of
intellectual property rights currently in force ensures that there is a
substantial amount of grit in the wheels of industry.

I begin with three stories from the past and a speech in a
House of Lords debate in 1841.
Filippo Brunelleschi was the first person in Europe to be
granted a patent for an invention. He was the genius who designed
and constructed the great dome of Santa Maria del Fiore, Florence
cathedral. The city fathers gave out the architectural work by a series
of competitive tenders. When he tendered Brunelleschi was fearful
that others would steal his ideas and get the work. So he generally
tendered without saying how the job was going to be done, For
instance, he was frightened about disclosing how he was going to raise
the many tonnes of stone needed to create the great dome. It nearly
cost him the work. By and large he was lucky in that, although he
never explained how he was going to do a thing, he got the job
anyway. But late in the project he was so concerned about piracy that
♦

© 2009 Sir Robin Jacob
The Right Honourable Lord Justice Jacob, Justice of the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales, in charge of the Intellectual Property List. The Justice’s remarks were
delivered at the Gray’s Inn Reading at Gresham College, June 25 2002.

∗

41

he procured from the city fathers a patent, granted in 1421. He
wanted 650 tons of a pure white marble called Bianchi Marmi for the
8 great ribs of the cupola. It was to come from a quarry at Carrera,
some 65 miles away. The cheapest way to bring the marble was via
the Arno, if it could be done. But the 50 miles from Pisa to Florence
was most troublesome - the Arno was tideless, prone to silting and
also to flooding. Brunelleschi devised some sort of barge to solve the
problem. He was given a three year patent - a term which was
extended at least once because the invention had not been put into
use. Brunelleschi's patent does not disclose the details of his design.
But informed guesses have been made. It was probably some sort of
vast amphibious raft provided with giant wooden wheels to deal with
shallows. We know the Florentines called it Il Badalone - "the
Monster." Eventually Il Badalone was constructed and loaded with
100 tons of Bianchi Marmi. It set off from Pisa. It sank or became
stranded less then halfway to Florence. The marble was lost.
Brunelleschi's attempts to salvage it failed. I expect it is still there.
Thus the modern intellectual property system began with a
flop. It has certainly moved on since then.
The first British patent
was more of a success. It was granted to a Dutchman, John of Uthnam
in 1449. He had special techniques for making stained glass windows.
He was given a monopoly plus also certain tax advantages in return
for which he had to make the stained glass windows of Eton College
and a now defunct Cambridge College. Notably, he also had to train
apprentices in the new techniques. Here is what his patent said:
“and because the said art has never been used in England
and John intends to instruct divers lieges of the king in
many other arts never used in the realm beside the said art
of making glass, the king retains him therefore for life at his
wages and fees and grants that no liege of the king learned
in such arts shall use them for a term of twenty years
against the will and assent of John, under a penalty of £200,
whereof two parts shall be rendered to the king and one
part to John, any liege who cannot levy that sum to suffer
imprisonment without delivery save by the king’s special
command.”
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I do not think history records what John's invention was.
Certainly his patent did not say.
I say "invention" because, until
1977, British law treated the person who first brought an idea from
abroad here as much an inventor as if he had devised it himself.
My third story is later in time - well after the early
Renaissance and at the beginning of the industrial revolution. It is of
the Boulton and Watt patent for a steam engine. We all know that
James Watt invented the steam engine. Every schoolboy and girl
knows the story of him watching the kettle lid rise and appreciating
the power of steam. But the story is a distortion of the truth. Watt
did not devise any engine powered by steam.
He devised an
improvement on the existing Newcomen engine. In that engine the
cylinder was filled with steam which drove back the piston. The
steam was then condensed in the cylinder. Watt realised this was
wasteful. His idea was to condense the steam in a separate condenser
- thereby, in his words "not wasting a particle of steam". He found a
brilliant entrepreneur in Boulton. Their partnership exploited the
patent brilliantly - not, primarily, by sales of actual engines (though
they did make some parts, such as valves). What they did was to
demand royalties on the basis of the savings made by using the Watt
invention compared with using the Newcomen engines. Although
the users of engines were saving money by the use of the Watt engine,
the payment of royalties, as it often does, came to cause much
resentment. It is all too easy to take an invention for granted once it
has been made. One is reminded of the Burgers of Hamlin Town
before and after the problem was solved:
Before:
"Will you give me a thousand guilders?"
"One? Fifty thousand - was the exclamation
Of the astonished Mayor and Corporation"

After:
"But as for the guilders, what we spoke
Of them, as you very well know, was in joke.
Besides our losses have made us thrifty.
A thousand guilders! Come take fifty."
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Boulton and Watt used the law and the threat of law
powerfully. They restricted use to designs of engine controlled by
them. They were none too precise as to what the scope of their patent
was, but made it clear that any variant was likely to result in a lawsuit.
They sent grim faced men from Birmingham to Cornwall to serve
Writs and injunctions. The Cornishmen did not take this lightly.
They suspended one man who tried to serve an injunction by ropes
over a mineshaft. There was a lot of litigation. Boulton and Watt
largely won, but, in holding a particular machine to be piratical, Chief
Justice Eyre expressed great doubt as to whether the Specification was
sufficient. But that did not prevent Boulton and Watt from further
merciless exploitation of the patent.
The vice-like control of Boulton and Watt, exercised by a
combination of actual and perceived or merely forcefully claimed
rights finally went with expiry of the patent in 1799. The control
plainly hindered the development of Steam engines, particularly the
development of "strong steam" engines - that is to say, high-pressure
engines. Richard Trevithick was the first to realise completely that if
you used high enough pressure you could do away with condensing
the steam altogether. You just let it escape to atmospheric pressure.
The machine "puffed" as the steam formed clouds of water droplets.
True you lost a "particle of steam" (which you could have condensed
by cooling) but that was well worth the saving. The whole engine
could be small enough to be put on a carriage and drive the wheels motor transport was born properly. Trevithick's puffers came shortly
after the Watt patent went.
My piece of Parliamentary debate relates to the fierce
arguments in the 1840's about the length of term of copyright. By
1840 the term was 28 years from publication or until the year of death
of the author, whichever was the longer. It was thought too short. A
Bill was introduced into the Common by Sergeant Talfourd to make
the term 60 years from the death of the author. Lord Macauley
opposed this vehemently in the Lords. Here is some of what he said:
"It is good that authors should be remunerated, and the least
exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly.
Yet monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good we must
submit to the evil: but the evil ought not to last a day
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longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the
good"

He went on to point out that the balance between the evil of
monopoly and the good of author's remuneration shifted in favour of
the evil the longer the term:
"A monopoly of 60 years produces twice as much evil as a
monopoly of 30 years and thrice as much evil as a monopoly
of 20 years. But it is by no means the fact that a
posthumous monopoly of 60 years gives to the author thrice
as much pleasure and thrice a strong a motive as a
posthumous monopoly of 20 years."

He went to give an example. The quote is a little long, but delicious:
"Dr Johnson died 56 years ago. If the law were what my
honourable and learned friend wishes to make it, somebody
would now have the monopoly of Dr Johnson's works.
Who that somebody would be, it is impossible to say: but
we may venture to guess. I guess, then, that it would have
been some bookseller, who was the assignee of another
bookseller, who was the grandson of a third bookseller, who
had bough the copyright from Black Frank, the Doctor's
servant and residuary legatee in 1785 or 1786. Now, would
the knowledge that this copyright would exist in 1841 have
been a source of gratification to Johnson? Would it have
stimulated his exertions? Would it have once drawn him
out of his bed before noon? Would it have cheered him in
a fit of spleen? Would it have induced him to give us one
more allegory, one more life of a poet, one more imitation
of Juvenal? I firmly believe not."

What can we learn from these bits of history in a modern
context? Well, actually rather a lot. I start with John's patent. A
major purpose of the grant of John’s patent was in part the same as the
purpose of a patent today, namely that disclosure of an invention
should be given in return for a time-limited monopoly. John was to
disclose to apprentices - the modern way is to disclose in the patent
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itself. By and large the system works well. Disclosure of inventions
still lies at the heart of the system but a little less so than it was.
Under our old law, the rule was that if you commercialised an
invention, even by a single sale, prior to seeking a patent, the patent
was no good - it was not novel.
You could not even secretly work
the invention without making any subsequent patent invalid. The
common law encouraged, as far is it could, early disclosure in the
trade off between incentive to invent and monopoly. Now the rule is
different. Only a disclosure which enables a skilled man to work the
invention invalidates. A product can be in all the shops, but unless
you can work out how it is made, there can be a subsequent patent.
The balance shifted towards monopoly - as it has in almost every
aspect of intellectual property over the last 30 years, both in terms of
legislation and judicial decisions, particularly, so far as the latter are
concerned, in the USA.
Disclosure now leads to a new problem - information
overload.
By 2001 the European Patent Office had grown from
nothing in 1977 to a staff of over 5000 and an annual income of about
nearly €1 billion.
In 2001 it received 110,000 patent applications.
Now we all know that there are many ideas which seem bright at the
time but subsequently turn out to be useless or worse. That is very
true of patents and patent applications. Applications are examined for
novelty and inventive step. Some fail at that stage. Others are
granted but for one reason or another the idea is not considered
worthwhile protecting. The number of patents which are renewed by
the payment of fees to the end of their maximum life, 20 years, is but
a small proportion of those filed. So there are many many patent
specifications out there but no one to tell you which ones are
commercially important, or even which ones actually work as
promised.
Many patents are for ideas no better or more practical
than was Brunelleschi's for Il Badalone.
It remains the case however that industry must read all patent
applications relevant to its activities It must do so to see whether
anything it does or is proposing to do infringes or will do so. In that
regard alone, I was told that BP estimated over half the resources of its
patent department were devoted to that task. The applications must
also be read to learn of new ideas - the system there serving its
intended purpose - the same purpose expressed in John of Uthnam's
patent.
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In passing it may be worth noting a second order effect, not
intended in the time of Brunelleschi or John of Uthnam. Important
commercial monopolies create an incentive to design around them.
This incentive is additional to the incentive provided by the prospect
of a patent monopoly. Glaxo’s Zantac (ranitidine) was at one point
the top selling pharmaceutical in the world. It was the result of an
inventive design around SmithKline’s cimetedine patent. The
incentive to design around was one of the spurs of the men of
Cornwall faced with Boulton and Watt.
On any basis, therefore the patent system has a substantial
"transaction cost" – a happy phrase of economists. All patent offices,
patent agents and patent lawyers are part of that transaction cost.
Indeed you are hearing from a transaction cost at this very minute.
So great has been the growth of intellectual property law in the last 40
that I dare take a guess. It is that more than half of all intellectual
property lawyers of the World who have ever lived are still living and
probably still in active practice.
I wish to say some more about transaction costs. Intellectual
property rights, unlike say rights in land, are apt to be fuzzy at the
edges.
For instance whether an invention is obvious, whether a
word or phrase in a patent claim has a wide or narrow meaning,
whether one trademark is confusingly similar to another, whether a
substantial part of a copyright work has been taken, are all matters on
which reasonable minds can differ. In the competitive world served
by intellectual property rights attention is particularly focussed on
these fuzzy edges. If you want to make something competitive with a
patented product it is upon those fuzzy edges that you focus. And
uncertain laws again increase transaction costs. They also increase the
power of the skilful right holders - just as the uncertainty of Boulton
and Watt's rights did so many years ago.
It is for that reason that I think judges should, so far as they
can, strive to keep the edges of IP rights sharp. That has not always
been done. I give a recent example - one where the ECJ differed from
me. Under European trade mark legislation you infringe a registered
trade mark if you use it or a confusingly similar mark for the goods for
which it is registered. But you also infringe if you use it, or a
confusingly similar mark, for "similar goods."
So, if Kodak is
registered for film, the registration protects the mark used for similar
goods, probably, for instance, video tape but not, say, for socks. Now
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what I held was that the concept of "similar goods" was independent
of the nature or fame of the mark. The ECJ, on a reference from
Germany, differed. It held that the more famous a mark the wider the
ambit of "similar goods" for which there was protection. This is to
make a fuzzy rule fuzzier. The result has been as any trade mark
practitioner will tell you, increased uncertainty and therefore cost.
I turn to another area where width of IP rights has become a
topic of major debate. Many are saying that the patent system here is a
substantial hindrance to progress - more than a bit of grit in the
wheels - something like a large lump of concrete. I refer to the socalled patenting of genes.
It has become possible to identify stretches of DNA which
code for particular proteins. DNA has a double helix structure. Along
each strand of the helix are points of attachment to one of four
different chemical groups, A, T, G or C. As you go along the strand
you can have any one of the 4 groups at each position. So you can
have a code - for instance AGTCC…. It is now known how that code
works - when the gene is switched on, as they say, it tells various
chemicals in the cell to make a particular protein. So, by identifying
the code you can identify the protein. And (ignoring complications)
you can work backwards from the protein to the code.
The use of these techniques has enabled scientists to put
copies of particular genes into bacteria (and indeed animals) so that
they produce a particular protein.
For instance the protein
erythroproietin (epo) is made this way. Epo is an immensely valuable
drug for the treatment of anaemia - it is also misused by racing
cyclists, weight lifters and other athletes. What happened was this.
Natural epo is present in minute traces in human urine. Vast
quantities of urine were used by a man, appropriately named Dr
Goldwasser, to isolate a small amount of epo. Analysis of this made it
possible to work out what a bit of the genetic code - the gene - for
making it was. That in turn enabled scientists to find the rest of the
gene, isolate it, and put it into bacteria. The bacteria are then allowed
to breed, making epo, much as yeast makes alcohol.
The resulting patent has been the subject of much litigation.
It is currently being studied by our court of Appeal - precisely on the
question of its appropriate breadth. Our House of Lords had to
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consider related question concerning the breadth of the Patent for the
Hepatitis B vaccine - and held it too wide.
The problem with these gene patents is indeed their width.
For once you have isolated a gene you set about patenting it, not in
the body (which is old) but when isolated or contained in some new
carrier or cell. The width of such a patent is potentially enormous - it
will almost certainly cover the product of any further research based
on the gene.
It has also become possible to identify particular genes which
are associated with particular diseases. The precise mechanism by
which the gene either causes the disease (for instance Huntington's
disease) or causes a predisposition to a particular disease (for instance
breast cancer) remains unknown. But you can at least produce testing
kits for the disposition and even, perhaps, for the disease. Just as in the
time of Boulton and Watt the problem is width of monopoly and
perceived width of monopoly. I take a prominent example. A
company called Myriad and connected with the University of Utah
has two patents on two genes known to be associated with breast
cancer. The genes are called BRCA1 and 2. It is using the patents to
insist upon control over the testing of patients for the gene. It is
even, as I understand it, saying only it can carry out the tests.
Moreover many scientists fear that the patents impede research into
breast cancer. They may be legally wrong about that (in Europe, at
least, there is a reasonable research exemption to infringement) but it
is the perception that matters. Boulton and Watt's grim faced process
servers from Birmingham have their modern day equivalents, sharpsuited patent lawyers from New York or London, or open-necked
ones from California. They act on a global basis.
An associated problem with gene patents is the absence of any
ability to "design around". I observed earlier that a clear second order
effect of patents is as a spur to find something different. But gene
patents are not like that. Your genes are the only genes in town.
This again makes one wonder whether the patent system is too
powerful in this area of human endeavour.
I turn to other IP rights more generally. Before the 1960's
there were just 3 forms of these, patent for inventions, registered
design right and registered trade marks - with the latter went passing
off rights or like rights in other countries going by the name of "unfair
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competition. Each country had its own system. Now things are very
different. As part of the drafting process for the Civil Procedure Rules
which are to have a Part 63 "Intellectual Property" it became
necessary to list out the various types of right to which the rules
might apply. Here it is:
“Patents (whether granted by the EPO in Munich or the
British Patent Office), copyright, design right (whether
under our own 1988 Act or the Community Regulation),
registered designs (whether granted under the British
System or the forthcoming European system), registered
trade marks (whether granted by the UK Registry or the
Office for Harmonisation of the Internal Market in
Alicante), rights in performances, rights in semiconductor
topographies, plant variety rights, moral rights, database
rights, rights to prevent unauthorised decrypting, and
passing off.”

There are other candidates too - cases about the taking of
technical trade secrets and possibly Competition Act cases. This is an
awful lot to try to know about if you are a lawyer. It is industry
which has to pay for that knowledge.
Industry also has to pay for lawyers to know about much more
than their own country's laws and procedure. This is because trade is
so globalised. This has had its effect on the IP law - it too is being
globalised. That is particularly apparent within the European Union.
We now have European Union Trade Marks, we are about to have
European Union Registered and unregistered Design Rights. There is
an incomplete European Patent system. Under this laws have been
harmonised, there is a central granting authority but the result of a
grant is a bunch of parallel national patents which can only be
litigated in national courts. The EU is pressing to create a unitary EU
patent to be enforced by a new, EU court. It would be the first truly
federal court of Europe. Industry, by and large, supports this –
provided there is a judicial system which can be relied upon.
On a world scale there have been massive developments too.
Most prominent so far is the “Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights” of 1994. This forms part of the WTO
agreements. For practical purposes if a nation wishes to trade it has to
conform to these agreements and to TRIPS. For the first time ever
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there are international rules requiring member states to have basic IP
laws. For instance, by incorporation of the Berne Convention, TRIPS
requires members to have copyright laws protecting “literary and
artistic works” for a minimum of 50 years from the end of the author’s
death. Such works are defined very widely by Berne, but TRIPS goes
on expressly to include computer programs too. Some might say it
thus ensures the domination throughout the world of the big software
companies for the foreseeable future.
I have not time to say all that I would wish about TRIPS. I
will just say this. To require nations such as Bangladesh, upon pain of
trade sanctions, to have substantial intellectual property laws and a
system of enforcement of such laws is to ask for the impossible.
Although TRIPS provided some leeway for compliance, that leeway is
nowhere near enough. It is hardly surprising that it causes much
resentment. Mark Twain’s Connecticut Yankee at the Court of King
Arthur said that:
“ a country without a patent office and good patent laws
was just a crab that couldn’t travel anyway but sideways or
backwards.”

That is not true for third world countries. They may be crablike but
it is not the absence of a patent office which is the cause. And even
the Connecticut Yankee had in mind a system of laws which
encouraged local exploitation of inventions.
This brings me to the other feature of TRIPS worth
mentioning . Its major departure from the driving force of John of
Uthnam’s patent.
His patent was created so as to encourage
exploitation within the realm. TRIPS and the modern worldwide
patent system does not do that. It provides the monopoly but not the
local industry to go with it. So it does not create an incentive to
invest in third world countries. Again that is resented and again that
is hardly surprising. There are perhaps limited exceptions in the case
of medicines. And there can simply be such powerful political forces
that patent laws are swept aside – as happened in the case of the antiAIDS drug patents in South Africa.
One of the features of all these developments has been what
one might call the "ratcheting up" of rights. Let me give the paradigm
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example.
For reasons which are not clear, the Austrians and
Germans, but no-one else in Europe or elsewhere had settled on a
term of copyright which was 70 years from the year of death of the
author. The rest of the world had, for most of the last century, had a
life plus 50 year period. I have never found the justification for that
period, still less the German one. The latter is supposed to have
something to do with giving a reward not just to the author but his
children and grandchildren on the grounds that his children somehow
lost out due to the Great War. Whatever the reason, the disparity in
term was seen as distorting the common market, as it did. The
solution was to ratchet up all copyrights to life plus 70 years. It was
done with hardly any debate at the time. No doubt so far as our
Government was concerned it was worthwhile – British copyrights,
what with British Pop Music and the predominance of English as an
author’s language, are worth proportionately more than continental
copyrights. No-one cared about Joe public.
No one has justified, or could, justify this on the grounds for
the encouragement of authors. It is a pity that Lord Macauley was not
around to oppose any of this. Actually, so far as I can see, no one was
- not even that the extension was retrospective with only a limited
exception for those who had started exploiting a work whilst it was
out of copyright. Thus this year we have had the James Joyce
copyrights held to be partly in force - the Joyce estate is concerned to
preserve the purity of his work. One day people will be able to do
with it as they want.
The US has followed this ratcheting up by the EU. It too
extended copyright term to 70 years. Promotion of this was largely by
the vested interests of Hollywood and the record industry - the
inheritors of the mantles of Lord Macauley's booksellers. Even now
the Supreme Court is considering whether the extension either
prospective or retrospective, squares with the Constitution.
Here are another pair of cases where there is pressure to
ratchet rights upwards. First from the US. The US Courts have
increasingly been prepared to hold that particular types of subject
matter are patentable - "anything under the sun made by man" is the
test. So, in the US, both computer programs and business methods are
patentable if they are new and non-obvious. You can have a new and
improved insurance policy or even, so far as I can see, method of
stacking oranges on a barrow.
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So far as computer programs are concerned, no one asks
whether they need the patent system for their encouragement. They
already have copyright. No one could say that the rate of technical
improvement in that area has been slow - do we really need patents
too? As for business methods, competition lies at the heart of all
business. Businesses supply products or services, they do not supply
themselves. It is very difficult to see the economic justification for
business method patents. There is pressure from the US for the EU to
have both sorts of patent - to ratchet up.
There is ratcheting up pressure the other way too. The EU has
created a curious sort of right called a database right. Actually there
are two sorts of rights in databases – a copyright and a freestanding
right. The former is directed at copying from a compilation of
information. The latter is directed at extraction of information from a
database. The theory is easy: it costs a lot to put a database together.
So copying or its use should be protected. There are substantial
problems to be resolved as to the limits of these rights. But it is clear
that there are few defences inside those limits – nothing like a fair use
doctrine exists. The Europeans are pressing the Americans to ratchet
up their law to have database rights. The Americans are resisting.
They have judicially recently abandoned copyright in mere sweat and
toil works such as telephone directories. Many in the US are alarmed
at the notion of these database rights, which, if taken to their logical
conclusion certainly reach into many activities which people take for
granted. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that in reality
database rights are perpetual – for they undergo constant revision
thereby creating fresh rights. Again no one has asked MacCauley’s
basic question. Is the cost of the monopoly worth it?
I could go on, taking you through other rights which have
been created, reinforced or extended. Why, for instance, was the
term of a UK registered design extended in 1988 from 15 to 25 years?
But I believe I have said enough to paint a picture of increasing and
more complex IP rights on a global scale. We have moved a long way
from Brunelleschi’s first patent. But I rather think we have not
thought many of these rights through. We have been taken with the
word “protection”, which sounds good, and forgotten its obverse,
“monopoly” which sounds bad. We have in place such a complicated
and expensive set of laws for intellectual property that one can see
there is much grit. It is time to try to find out how much of that grit
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is worth it. And I suggest it is certainly time to stop putting more grit
into the machine, at least until we can know more about what we
have done so far.
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